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Piercing the Fog: 
National Security, Media and the Government 
Harvey Rishikof* 
Introduction 
At the Naval War College's 2006 Global Legal Challenges conference, I sat as a member of the Public Perceptions Under the Law panel. The panel was 
charged with the following questions: 
1. How does the media shape public perceptions of the law? Does the media 
generally shape such public perceptions in an accurate way? Does the 
media understand the law well enough to accurately in form the public of 
legal issues-and the related law-surrounding such issues? Does the 
media have an obligation to understand-and then provide an accurate 
recitation/analysis of -such law? Is there any responsibility on the part 
of the government to "educate" the media concerning legal issues and 
the law? 
2. Do public perceptions of the law ever serve to help shape national policy 
decisions? Should policy makers be attuned to the public's perception of 
the law affecting a particular legal issue? Or, can policy makers effect 
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decisions on the basis that the "national interests" concerns of the 
American populace will often outweigh its concern as to whether certain 
US actions are--or are not-lawful? 
3. Is the general public generally well or ill informed on legal issues? Should 
the government play an active role in "educating" the public on such 
issues through the media? For example, should the government act to 
correct an incorrect media analysis of the law affecting a current event? 
Does the government itself have a responsibility to accurately reflect the 
law? That is, to what extent should the government advocate a particular 
analysis of a legal issue when there are dearly differing views of the 
applicable law? Is the American public's view ofJrespect for the law affected 
by its perception of its elected representatives' "respect" for such law? 
4. What role do other "players" in the international community play in 
shaping the public's view of the law, that is, the Arab, the Israeli, the 
British, the Chinese, the Russian and Korean street? How? 
5. What role should academia play in "educating" the public on the law? 
Should academia see itself as a counterweight to any governmental 
attempt to "shape" the public's perception of the law? Is this a 
productive--or divisive-role that academia might play? 
My article answers these provocative questions in four parts: The Media-Pro-
fession or Business?; Government and Media: Public Law Diplomacy-Facts and 
Fictions; The International Community and the Public: The Image Struggle; and 
The Academic Community-The Proper Role? My goal is to provide perspective 
on the issues and raise some provocative points for future discussion and analysis. 
The Media-Profession or Business? 
The media is a critical shaper of public opinion about the law. But the definition of 
media has evolved. In the modern era we have become inundated with law and me-
dia from general press publications, specialized press publications, general televi-
sion shows, Court TV, movie documentaries, "mockumentaries," Hollywood 
movies, fiction thrillers, news magazine shows (e.g., Front/ine), websites and, the 
newest, the blogosphere. Since legal opinions on complicated subjects can easily be 
50 to 100 pages in length, the logic of legal opinions are hard to summarize for the 
general public. In the end, the final result of some cases is dear-guilty or not 
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guilty, constitutional or not constitutional. Many other cases, however, are much 
more subtle and deal with the nuances of congressional fact-finding and the defer-
ence owed to judicial review. These cases construe the inner workings of separation 
of power, federalism and/or political power. Easy and facile summaries usually dis-
tort the meanings. Increasingly fact and fiction, entertainment and education 
merge, and the lines between advocacy and information blend and blur. 
In many cases involving the Supreme Court, there may be vigorous dissents and 
multiple concurrences in the majority. Sorting out the holding or the center of 
gravity of the logic of the analysis can be challenging. Television commentators are 
usually given two or three minutes to explain the case. Print media has more space, 
but, unless the case addresses a "high-profile" issue, there is immediate coverage 
the day the opinion is handed down, and then little follow up editorial discussion. 
Perhaps the Sunday papers will have a more in-depth analysis or the Sunday talk 
shows will take up the issue. Although law reviews remain the serious vehicle for 
the legal academic community, their style and fo rmat condemn them to the 
rarified communities oflaw students and professors. 
Occasionally a "news magazine show," e.g., 60 Minutes, will do an extended 20-
minute segment. These shows will help shape the "general" sense of the meaning of 
the case or issue. Increasingly, websites and blog pages have become, by default, the 
place of extended commentary, analysis and focus. But this, in the end, is a limited 
conversation among a select group of the "legal elite chattering class." 
What is the media's obligation or responsibility? To my mind, this is a tricky 
question. As a first proposition, and at the risk of being overly controversial, let us 
conceive of the media as a business, not a profession . Reporters, journalists and 
producers wo rk for corporations that need to sell their products. Print media is 
under severe attack by the new emerging technologies. Print reporters for national 
papers, magazines, blogs and journals have gained personal reputations and fol-
lowings. Some media or commentators claim to be "neutral" in their reporting 
and analysis; others clearly reflect a bias or viewpoint and write with a "spin," e.g., 
"Activist liberal judges are rewriting the Constitution and should be impeached." 
Particular commentators stand out and have become "opinion makers." Their as-
sessments carry weight, and often in conversation one notes the dialogue: "Did you 
see X's (column, commentary or blog)? Do you agree?" Their influence turns on 
a number of factors--quality of analysis, accuracy in reporting, position in the 
media, insightfulness and clever commentary. The marketplace determines their in-
fluence; some markets prefer reinforcement, others accuracy and some satire, e.g., 
The Daily S}'OW. 
Rather than a "profession," however, the media are more akin to skilled arti-
sans, writers and performers commenting on the law and legal events, giving 
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perspectives and views. Although there is some distinction between the "op-ed" 
section and "news" sections of the media, increasingly the market place is eroding 
what once was an arguable separation. The obligation of the media is to "inform.» 
There is no constitutional or statutory requirement for "accuracy or analysis." Re-
porters are not sanctioned or regulated by the State and are not disbarred from the 
profession-no one can arrest them for practicing without a license. In fact, the 
First Amendment protects the media/press function from the preying regulatory 
interests of Congress: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of spee(:h, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Both rumor and fact are protected by the speech and press clauses. Lawyers and 
doctors have no such protection-imagine if they did? Albeit there are libel suits, 
but for public figures the bar is high. The concept of "if it bleeds, it leads" is alive 
and well in the United States. Moreover, US news and commentary crowds out 
news from other parts of the world. 
War correspondents have a particular challenge. Reporting the truth may dam-
age the war effort. Revealing military mistakes undermines confidence in the over-
all ability of US forces. Yet once embedded with the troops, the identification with 
the effort and the fact that the troops are protecting the reporter has to have an ef-
fect. Giving the "'soda straw" perspective is powerful, immediate and visceral, but is 
it relevant to the grand campaign? Finally, a hard professional question for the US 
media is the following hypothetical. Imagine a situation whereby Osama bin Laden 
contacts a US reporter and offers an exclusive in terview to tell his side of the story 
in a third country location-not in the United States o r in Iraq. Would a US re-
porter contact the military to tell of the offer? Would the US reporter agree to have 
a "global positioning" chip embedded in or on his person? Would a foreign jour-
nalist, offered the same opportunity, make the same choices as the US journalist? 
Are US reporters reporters, US nationals or professionals? 
Government and Media: Public Law Diplomacy--Facts and Fictions 
Faced with a media that is a business and a First Amendment that protects the in-
forming function, broadly defined, how should a government respond? What is 
the government's role in the public perception of the law? Should the government 
play an active role in "educating" the public on such issues through the media? For 
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example, should the government act to correct an incorrect media analysis of the 
law affecting a current event? What is the appropriate role for the government in 
responding to the shaping of the legal message for the public? 
First, the concept of government must be defined. Our government is com-
posed of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Historically, the federalju-
dicial branch has not involved itself in public information or public diplomacy 
campaigns. State judges, some of whom compete for public office, have been more 
"active" in explaining themselves during election periods. US federal judges, how-
ever, have been unique in the restraint they have shown as controversy mounts 
about the role of federal judges or the interpretation of an opinion. Although 
judges have written books, articles and law reviews, they rarely consent to be inter-
viewed and refuse to comment on current cases. Often is heard the refrain, "The 
case speaks for itself." This is not true in all legal jurisdictions. In Canada, for exam-
ple, the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice will hold press conferences to 
explain the meaning of a case recently handed down. This would be unprecedented 
in the US federal system. 
Judicial independence is protected by bar associations, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, think tanks and law schools speaking on behalf of the judiciary. In fact, 
attacking judges' independence has been a recurring historical phenomenon in the 
United States and public opinion heretofore has been mobilized to prevent other 
parts of the government from disciplining the courts. The defeat of the proposed 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt "court packing" plan in the 1930s resulted in even more 
independence being granted to the judiciary.l Prior to the fai led plan, the judiciary 
submitted its budget through the Department of Justice and the Attorney General 
of the United States. Once the plan was defeated, Congress passed legislation so 
that the judiciary submits its budget independently and directly to Congress 
through the Office of Management and Budget. 
This leaves the executive and the legislative branches. It is often the case that the 
government is divided, with one party controlling the presidency and the other 
controlling one or both houses. The legislature, with its power to hold public hear-
ings, can address judicial opinions directly with extensive deliberations. Scores of 
witnesses--experts, pundits and academics---<an be called to testify even under 
oath and render their opinions about critical legal issues. A legislative record is cre-
ated, and these proceedings are covered by the media and commentated upon. Vir-
tual media frenzies can be created with daily interviews, stories and gavel-to-gavel 
coverage of high-interest committee hearings. 
Senators and members of the House of Representatives have enormous power 
to shape the public debate through this process. The legislature can fill the public 
space with interviews, studies and research papers and conduct behind-the-scenes 
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lobbying and negotiating with the executive branch. In fact, members of the execu-
tive branch can be subpoenaed and forced to testify about events, positions and 
views. Although the President can invoke executive privilege, the Congress, public 
and media carefully scrutinize such tactics. 
The executive has an enormous array of tools at its disposal to "spin" legal issues 
and positions taken by the President . It is now a well-established Sunday morning 
ritual to have the President's men and women fan out across the talk shows with 
the same song sheet and present the White House position. The President's press 
conferences and ability to address the nation from the Oval Office, to "go directly" 
to the people over the heads of the media, is a powerful tool to influence the debate 
on legal policy issues. Pronouncements on legal issues by the President carry signif-
icant weight since it is assumed the leading legal minds of the administration have 
researched those issues and support the positions being taken. 
Recently the prosecution of "leaks" of even high-ranking government officials 
and the subpoenaing of reporters by US attorneys for the identity of sources have 
demonstrated a new weapon by the executive to control the flow of information. 
The revelation by syndicated columnist Robert Novak of Valerie Plame Wilson as 
an undercover CIA officer, and the subsequent investigation by the US Attorney 
for the Northern District of lIIinois, Patrick]. Fitzgerald, involving I. Lewis 
"Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's former chief of staff and national 
security adviser, and the holding of Judith Miller of the New York Times for con-
tempt in not revealing her source is clear evidence of the executive's power to shape 
the terrain for the flow of information. 
Moreover, the prosecution of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's 
(AlPAC) director of foreign policy, Steve Rosen, and an Iran specialist, Keith 
Weissman, in addition to Lawrence Franklin, an Iran analyst at the Department of 
Defense (DoD), will be the first time the fede ral government has charged two pri-
vate citizens with leaking State secrets. According to the indictment, Rosen and 
Weissman repeatedly sought and received sensitive information, both classified 
and unclassified, and then passed it on to others in order to advance their policy 
agenda. In the case, it is alleged that Rosen and Weissman received the information 
from a DoD official, Franklin, who wanted the information passed on to other offi-
cials. For some legal experts, the prosecution threatens political and press freedom 
by making the flow of information and ideas a crime. Federal prosecutors are using 
the Espionage Act for the firs t time against Americans who are not government of-
ficials, do not have security clearances and, by all indications, are not a part of a for-
eign spy operation. The prose<.:Ution of the strategic leak whereby one part of the 
executive charges another part of the executive raises the question of who is using 
whom in the process of shaping opinion. 
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The press and the legal communities are carefully watching these cases to see 
how the courts will strike the balance between leaks, information flo w, national se-
curity, the First Amendment and the right to know. The resolution will help shape 
the debate for the future. 
The International Community and the Public: The Image Struggle 
What role do other "players" in the international community have in shaping the 
public's view of the law-that is, the Arab, the Israeli, the British, the Chinese, the 
Russian and Korean street? The issue of the public is best understood in the context 
of public diplomacy to include the several publics involved, for example, in the 
War on Terrorism (US, European, Afghani, Iraqi, other Middle Eastern). Since 9/ 
11, the US public's approval rating for the Iraqi confli ct has steadily trended down-
ward from 90% to about 40%. The world media are central to shaping public per-
ceptions, but the expectation that the media will simply be "fair" is misplaced. How 
much the US public is affected by foreign press is unclear. AI Jazeera loops pictures 
of noncombatant Palestinians being killed by Israeli forces and then cuts to US 
forces in Iraq and noncombatant Iraqi corpses. The number of Iraqi dead is still 
not fully reported in the US media, but the world community opposed to the war 
focuses on the civilian casualties. The world media approaches the subject with its 
own views and that is the way it is and should be. 
Covering the war by leaving Baghdad's Green Zone is a dangerous enterprise. 
According to Reporters Without Borders, the war in Iraq has proved to be the dead-
liest for journalists since World War II. As of November 2006, a total of 135 jour-
nalists and media assistants have been killed in Iraq since the war began on March 
20,2003. This is more than the number killed during 20 years of war in Vietnam or 
the civil war in Algeria. Iraq is also one of the world's biggest marketplaces for hos-
tages, with 38 journalists kidnapped in three years. Five of them were executed. 
Three are still being held by their abductors. Around 63 journalists were killed in 
Vietnam during the 20 years from 1955 to 1975. A total of 49 media professionals 
were killed in the course of their work during the war in the former Yugoslavia 
from 1991 to 1995. During the civil war in Algeria from 1993 to 1996,77 journalists 
and media assistants were killed.2 
One can have only admiration and deep respect for those reporters and com-
mentators willing to sacrifice their lives to tell the story of Iraq. Informing the pub-
lic accurately on legal issues emanating from the conflict is even more problematic, 
especially given the growing gap between US and European views on relevant in-
ternationallaw questions. The gap is largely a topic of conversation among elites, 
however, and the participation of the media and the public is not central. The 2006 
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US election demonstrates, however, that the status of the war affected the Ameri-
can people and coverage and commentary was critical. 
But there are critical cultural differences between the United States and the 
world. Europe, for example, believes that the death penalty is a violation ofhwnan 
rights while the United States and the Supreme Court hold that the death penalty is 
part of US culture and heri tage. In this sense, "soft power," as understood by Jo-
seph Nye,3 is not effective if the message runs counter to world opinion. 
Legal commentators are a new, vibrant phenomenon; they and other shapers of 
public perceptions are delivering information very rapidly and in ever-new ways 
technologically. Commentators on the blogosphere now have tremendous power, 
as do the dominant images that ultimately become adopted as emblems of a con-
flict in the public consciousness. Which picture will be the iconic emblem of the 
war-the statue of Saddam Hussein coming down? Or the hooded detainee from 
Abu Ghraib? Or the pictures of the long lines of a free and democratic Iraq voting? 
For Vietnam, the pictures of Saigon police chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan's raised pis-
tol to the temple of a suspect and of the young girl, Kim Phuc, who ran naked from 
the napalm attack on her village became the public's images of the war frozen in the 
minds of the US population. 
These pictures of Vietnam captured what appeared to be violations of interna-
tional law, and became metaphors, right or wrong, for the war. Reality may be very 
different from the image or perception. Recently, Dominic Johnson and Dominic 
Tierney have argued that theTet offensive of Jan uary 1968 was actually an unmiti-
gated disaster for the communists (no targets were held and approximately 40,000 
Vietcong were killed), but the attack was viewed as a defeat fo r the United States 
due to the previous overblown expectations of public opinion that victory was near 
fo llowing President Johnson's expansive rhetoric before the offensive, the fact the 
US embassy was placed under direct fire, and the way the media portrayed the of-
fensive and the Vietcong resurgence.4 The fog of battle can cloud press coverage 
and portrayal. As has often been noted, truth is the first casualty of war. Perception 
is critical. When the stakes are high, however, and pictures and facts of casualties 
contradict the government's portrayal of reality, the public's mood can swing dra-
matically, particularly in election season. 
The Academic Community-The Proper Role? 
What role should academia play in educating the public on the law? Should aca-
demia see itself as a counterweight to any governmental attempt to shape the pub-




The academic role in educating the public is often equivocal: the academic 
search for long-term truths and guiding principles does not often yield informa-
tion that readily impacts public perceptions. Increasingly, academics are flooding 
the airwaves, blogs and documentaries, and giving on-the-spot commentary. The 
O.J. Simpson trial began a trend that has continued in force. From the perspective 
of John Stuart Mill, this is all good-the more speech in a democracy the better. Let 
the marketplace of ideas sort out the cacophony of voices. Often the same "usual 
suspects" show up for the pithy quote in the article by the well-known journalist or 
commentator. (I must confess to pleading guilty on this charge.) Other academics 
have chosen to start their own blogs where they keep a running commentary on the 
legal issues that fall undertheir expertise. It is only a question oftime before the Su-
preme Court cites a blog as a source of authority for an opinion. 
Independence and tenure give academia a special voice in the legal debates. 
When the legal community uniformly disagrees with the government's position, it 
has an impact on the public's sense of propriety. How much impact is unclear. 
Moreover, the most significant question is what effect the community has on the 
court deciding the issues. Are judges or justices swayed by amicus briefs from re-
spected members of the legal community overwhelmingly agreeing on a position? 
More often than not, the community will be divided, with respected voices on both 
sides of the "vs." The judge's own independence is the final arbiter, not the aca-
demic community. The academic community acts more like a searchlight illumi-
nating the different paths. The court must choose the route, and then be held 
responsible. 
ConciU5ion 
So where does this leave the debate of national security, media and the govern-
ment? Piercing the fog of confusion is never an easy task. Essential to our democ-
racy is open debate. Our cacophony, like our democracy, is the best approach given 
the alternatives. Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States has no Official Se-
crets Act,S although the combination of the Title 18 provisions criminalizing fraud 
and related activity in connection with computers6 and the State-secrets privilege, 
tied to prosecutions under the Espionage Act,' brings such a regime closer. Faced 
with such a threat, some have called for a federal shield law for reporters and Sena-
tors Richard Lugar, Arlen Specter, Christopher Dodd and Charles Schumer spon-
sored the Free Flow of Information Act of 2006.8 
Until such time when such a United Kingdom approach takes hold, our system 
remains one of no prior restraints, few media regulations (e.g., the Federal Com-
munication Commission), private law suits for defamation, a private multi-faceted 
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media, an independent legal system, unregulated new worldwide technologies of 
communication, a ship of State that "leaks" from the top and a literate audience. 
True, it is an audience more interested in Monday Night Football, Judge Judy, The 
Daily SIIOW, and Dancing with the Stars, but it is an audience that has the right and 
the ability to engage and become involved ifi t so chooses. We call it, in short, free-
dom of the press. Warts and all, the best remedy is more commentary, to para-
phrase lohn Stuart Mill. 
Notes 
I. FDR allegedly presented the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 to relieve the work-
load of elderly judges. The bill would have allowed FDR to appoint one judge for each sitting 
judge over age 70 and six months with at least ten years of experience. FDRcouid have appointed 
six more Supreme Court justices immediately, increasing the size of the court to 15 members. A 
Congress dominated by Democrats would have been expected to appoint judges friendly to FDR 
and his New Deal agenda. The measure was opposed by senior leaders of the Democratic party 
and defea ted. Controversy still surrounds the reason why Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts 
changed his vote. p rior to the bill's defeat in Congress, on a minimum wage law. but his vote be-
came known as "the switch in time that saved nine.» 
2. This information is compiled from the Reporters Without Borders websi te. See http:// 
www.rsf.orglspet:iaLiraq...en.php3 and http://www.rsf.orglarticle.php3?id_article=16793 (both 
last visited Dec. 27. 2(06). The numbers of journalists and media killed in Iraq are continually 
increasing. For example. by December that figure had risen from 135 in November to 139. 
3. See, e.g., JOSFPH S. Ny£, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 
(2004). 
4. See Dominic Johnson & Dominic Tierney, The Wars of Perception, NEW YORK T1MFS, 
Nov. 28, 2006, at A23. 
5. Official5ecrets Act, 1989. 
6. 18 US Code sec. 1030 (2000) . 
7. Public Law No. 65-24, 40 Statutes at Large 217 (I917). 
8. S. 2831, 109th Congress (2006) . 
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The Military and the Media in Perspective: 
Finding the Necessary Balance 
James P. Terry* 
I n reviewing the recent events in Iraq and the War on Terrorism vis-a.-vis the media, the one obvious question asked by all Americans today, including those 
in mili tary service, is who do the media represent . Do they represent the voice of 
the American people, or do they represent a defined elite concerned with a change 
in the political landscape in the United States? 
Recent Background to Current Contentiousness 
Two recent incidents, I believe, are indicative of the current unease between the 
military and the media and force us to reflect on who and what the media repre-
sents in their reporting on military activities. In early 2005, Newsweek, owned by 
the Washington Post Company, published a story by Michael Ishikoff claiming 
that a copy of the Koran had been flushed down a toilet by an American interroga-
tor at Guantanamo, Cuba, in front of Muslim intelViewees. When evidence was 
produced that showed it to be false. Newsweek belatedly retracted the story but only 
after much damage to the US m ilitary's image occurred in those countries with 
whom we must cooperate in the War on Terrorism.l More importantly, the rioting 
that fo llowed resulted in 16 deaths in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Newsweek, 
.. Colonel, Uni ted States Marine Corps (ReL). 
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moreover, wanted no part of the White House's request that it help repair the dam-
age. And, unfortunately, no journalist from any major news organization wrote 
that they should. 
The current reporting of the Haditha story also bears mentioning. The rush to 
judgment of the Marines involved by the US media without waiting until the facts 
are determined has been viewed by many as simply reflective of the media's ten-
dency to believe the worst. More significantly, the fact that the incident was re-
ported immediately to superiors by the Marines involved, that those in command 
were made aware of the civilian deaths contemporaneous with the incident, and 
that the squad involved has consistently claimed that they followed their rules of 
engagement in clearing the buildings from which they took fire, have all been con-
veniently overlooked by the mainstream media in their reporting. More impor-
tantly, there has been no investigative reporting on standard procedures for 
clearing buildings from which fire is taken and no interest in reporting the context 
in which these deaths occurred. 
What is most difficult to understand is why the press, most of whom have not 
served in the military, so often chooses to believe fo reign sources proven incorrect 
in the past, and disregard the voices of fellow Americans who are daily placing 
themselves in harm's way fo r our nation's foreign interests. Military lawyers also 
ask why the press ignores the basic legal principles that apply in irregular 
belligerencies where unlawful combatants are engaged with national forces-in 
this case coalition forces and forces of the new Iraqi government. We must also ask 
why there is such a bent to discredit and criticize US efforts rather than understand 
the rationale behind coalition actions aimed at ensuring we can "stay the course" in 
Iraq and the reasons for the immediate actions in support thereof. 
With that said, our charge must be to assess the relationship between the media 
and the military as it relates to an understanding and articulation of the legal pa-
rameters of the current conflict in Iraq as covered by the press-that is, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Our goal should be to increase mutual understanding at both the 
personal and institutional levels of what the legal regime actually represents with 
respect to the military's operational requirements in the War on Terrorism and the 
legal framework under which the current conflict is being pursued. One would 
hope that the effort here today can help lead to practical solutions to areas of friction 
in communication between the two. Finally, our ultimate quest must be how can 
we maintain a vibrant, robust freedom of expression while protecting the nation's 
capacity to fight our wars effectively. 
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The ugal Principles Underlying Irregular Belligerencies: 
Often Ignored in the Reporting on Iraq 
The Nature of the Current Violence 
As discussed below in detail, the media's use of the now firmly ingrained term, "in-
surgents," or "insurgency," is both factually and legally incorrect and reflects the 
media's misunderstanding of the conflict. 
The Global War on Terrorism was clearly not contemplated when the four 
Geneva Conventions, addressing wars between national entities, were signed in 
1949.2 The violence in Iraq currently perpetrated by al Qaeda and elements of the 
former regime is being spearheaded by individuals under no known national au-
thority, with no command structure that enforces the laws and customs of warfare, 
and with no recognizable, distinguishing military insignia. More importantly, they 
represent no identifiable national minority in Iraq. Their attacks have injured and 
killed civilians of all ethnic groups, as well as more than 2,500 US military person-
nel attempting to assist the democratic government in Baghdad to succeed. Their 
use of children and women as lookouts and information gatherers is reminiscent of 
Vietnam and raises serious questions about the status of those individuals when 
acting on behalf of terrorist fighte rs in Iraq. The fact that this status is seldom, if 
ever, acknowledged by the press raises serious concerns for the mili tary in their ef-
forts to assure the public of our adherence to the law of war. 
It is important to understand that terrorist violence provides no legal gloss for 
its perpetrators. The critical international law principles applicable to the violence 
in Iraq are found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in Common Article 33 relating 
to internal armed conflicts and the principles en unciated in the two Additional 
Protocols to these Conventions negotiated in 1977.4 The minimal protections af-
forded by Common Article 3, for example, include prohibitions on inhwnane 
treatment of noncombatants, including members of the armed forces who have 
laid down their arms. Specifically forbidden are "murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment," and extrajudicial executions. 
Provision must also be made for collecting and caring for the sick and wounded. 
The 1977 Geneva Protocols had their roots in wars of national liberation follow-
ing World War II. Colonial powers, to include the United States, France, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands, had engaged these liberation movements militarily, 
often with little regard for the law of armed conflict. In the 1974 conference 
hosted by the Swiss government in Geneva, the need to regulate conflicts of a 
non-international character was addressed in Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I 
and is the subject of Additional Protocol II. At the confere nce, the Swiss 
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Government invited members of national liberation organizations to participate, 
but not vote. 
The participation of non-State actors helped shape the drafting of Article 96, 
paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol I. This section provides that a party to a conflict 
with a State army can unilaterally declare it wants the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1977 Protocols to apply. This would, of course, offer greater protection for 
members of national liberation movements. Under Article 96, however, parties 
authorized to make such a declarat ion had to establish that they were involved 
in "armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial do mination 
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination."5 In Iraq, however, terrorists are trying to unseat the govern-
ment that has been overwhelmingly approved by the people. Moreover, al Qaeda 
has made no statement that it desires the Geneva Conventions to apply. 
These terrorists, or unlawful combatants, however described, have no juridical 
existence other than as common criminals. Additional Protocol I, Article I con-
fli cts, or those between a nation and a recognized insurgency seeking a legal status, 
differ from the present terrorist violence in that participants in Article I conflicts 
opposing government forces are required to meet certain minimum requirements. 
These are: ( I) that they operate under responsible command and are subject to in-
ternal military discipline; (2) that they carry their arms openly; and (3) that they 
otherwise distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population.6 In return 
they are accorded certain protections when captured. It is doubtful that those per-
petuating violence in Iraq today meet these criteria for the status of insurgent. 
Moreover, they are exploiting every ethnic group fo r their own vicious ends, with-
out regard for these requirements. 
The fact that these terrorists have no recognized and protected status under the 
Geneva Conventions or their Protocols, and employ methods completely banned 
by the laws of armed conflict, is likewise seldom articulated by mainstream report-
ers. In addition, al Qaeda's failure to adhere to the most basic tenets of interna-
tionallaw on the battlefield is never addressed. What is addressed is every claimed 
violation of the law by American service members, often responding to acts of sav-
agery by Muslim extremists claiming to act on behalf of Allah, not on behalf of a 
national or sub-national entity. The fact that these claimed violations of the law of 
war by Americans are often subsequently found to be without substance seems to 
never appear in print. 
The Status of the AI Qaeda and Other Anti-Government Participants 
While the press today insists on calling these terrorists " insurgents," the fact that 
they are the basest of criminals, and not insurgents with minimal juridical status 
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under Article I, Protocol I, as discussed above, is never recited. The fact that they do 
not represent even a significant minority of the Sunnis, Shiites or Kurds is never ex-
plained. (We know this because 70% from all sectors voted in the December 2005 
elections for a democratic government.) And there is never a call in the press for the 
Iraqi people to stand up and denounce these perpetrators of violence who are even 
now sucking the lifeblood from the fledgling Iraqi Government . 
The law of armed conflict is based largely on the distinction between combat-
ants and noncombatants. Unfortunately, in Iraq, the clear distinction normally 
witnessed in conflict (i.e., belligerents on the one hand and the civilian populace on 
the other) is significantly blurred. Nor are all elements that are perpetuating the vi-
olence today working toward the same ends. Baathist operatives within the Sunni 
elite who were formerly within Saddam's inner circle are trying to prevent the 
fledgling democracy from succeeding. The al Qaeda leadership is focused on driv-
ing the Western influences from Iraq and it is likewise targeting any supporters of 
the current coalition effort to help the new Iraqi government sustain democracy. 
Certain members of the Shiite leadership have used the turmoil as an opportunity 
to settle scores while at the same time refusing to commit completely to the new re-
gime until it is determined that it can succeed. Shiite religious leaders like Sistani 
are remaining silent. The Kurds have opted to remain on the sidelines in the north 
and take a wait and see approach while at the same time ostensibly supporting the 
new regime. Then there are the local rivalries, and in Iraq, all politics are local. I saw 
that in Fallujah in late 2004 and in early 2005 when I was there on behalf of the Sec-
retary of State. 
The point is that the Marines under scrutiny at Haditha responded to attack in a 
very complex environment. The key question had to be whether they followed the 
legally scrubbed rules of engagement and, equally important, whether the ruJes of 
engagement followed, if in fact they were followed, actually applied to the facts on 
the ground as they presented themselves to the Marines involved. Major General 
Bargewell, the investigating officer, is now carefully examining these questions on 
behalf of the Secretary of Defense. 
These cross currents, and the fact that our Marines and Army forces are dealing 
with a period of carefuJly orchestrated violence, need to be more accurately por-
trayed by the media. The fact that individuals, including women and children, who 
participate actively and directly in support of combat activities (such as providing 
combat intelligence, physically shielding combatants, etc.) themselves become 
combatants and are legitimate targets of attack, needs to be explained. That is why 
it is so critical that reporting on events such as the Haditha killings receive careful 
review and carefuJ attention. 
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Finding the Appropriate Military-Media Relationship 
We must ask then, what is the appropriate balance in reporting in the current 
struggle in Iraq? How can the media report events in a more accurate way? What 
can the military do to provide the legal insights necessary for the media to fully un-
derstand the operational legal issues that have and will arise? There is no question 
that public perceptions of the law and, more specifically, perceived violations of the 
law shape national policy decisions. This was never more true than in Vietnam, 
where the My Lai murders helped to sour the Vietnamese public on our continued 
presence there, and the US public on our continued participation in that conflict. 
In the present conllict in Iraq, the allegations concerning the alleged murders at 
Haditha and other similar incidents are even now shaping national policy deci-
sions. It was no accident that when President Bush visited Baghdad on June 13, 
2006 he met with the new Iraqi Prime Minister and expressed support for contin-
ued US presence on the one hand, while urging the Iraqis to move quickly to train 
their own forces and to take the lead in their own defense. 
There is also no question that the climate under which the military and the me-
dia operate has intensified since September 11,2001. A 2005 Gallup Poll found that 
large majorities of both the military respondents and the public believe that news 
stories about the military tend to be too negative.7 Members of all three groups, 
military, media and the public, however, believe that embedding the media within 
the operational forces enhances the public's understanding of the war, helps the 
morale of the troops, improves the public's perception of the military and im-
proves the credibility of the media coverage. It is the understanding which flows 
from embedding, not mere information, which makes the difference between fair 
coverage and something less. 
The Pradical Effects of Embedding 
It was during the Bosnian peacekeeping operation in 1995 that reporters were first 
authorized and assigned to accompany US forces as part of an authorized compre-
hensive program. This was short-lived, however, as a sensitive conversation be-
tween a commander and his men concerning racist attitudes of one of the Balkan 
parties to the conflict was reported by a Wall Street ]ounlal reporter (Tom Ricks). 
The program was robustly adopted, however, by US military commanders in Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The more than 600 reporters who were approved 
for the program received a week-long "boot camp" of sorts aboard ship and at sites 
such as Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and facilities 
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in Kuwait.s New York Times journalist Andrew Jacobs found it to be "alternatively 
enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and physically exhausting."9 
While nearly all reporters involved in the program during Operation Iraqi Free-
dom believed it gave them a greater feel for the war and a better understanding of 
the military as a result of their training and experience, there were concerns by 
publishers that negative stories by embedded reporters never caught the public's 
attention. These included stories offailed supply planning, civilian casualties, frat-
ricide and theft. I believe that this lack oftraction for negative stories can be largely 
attributed to the overwhelming success of the initial campaign and the belief on the 
part of most Americans that the coalition force had done a remarkable job, despite 
the reported negative events. 
While the embedding program was no t institutionalized during Vietnam and 
earlier, one only has to recall the excellent reporting of Ernie Pyle in the Pacific dur-
ing World War II to understand that the embedding of individual reporters has a 
long and proud history. In Vietnam, Joe Galloway, who subsequently wrote We 
Were Soldiers Once, with Major General Hal Moore, spent 25 years traveling "up 
close and personal" with military units-primarily Marine and Army infantry 
commands. It was his reporting in the Ia Drang Valley (pronounced Na Trang) in 
November 1965 with an Army Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division facing over-
whelming odds which catapulted him onto the world stage. Galloway described his 
feelings on his reporting this way: 
There, in the mud, is where war is most visible and easiest understood. There no one 
will lie to you; no one will try to put a spin on the truth. Those for whom death waits 
around the next bend or across the next rice paddy have no time and little taste for the 
games that are played with such relish in the rear. No one ever lied to me within the 
sounds of the guns.10 
The commitment by the media to embedding their reporters in Iraq has now 
waned . While at one time several hundred reporters were assigned to operating 
units, today that number stands at no more than 25. More than 40 media person-
nel, to include reporters, cameramen and assistants, have perished in attacks dur-
ing the War on Terror. When a newsperson is attacked, as has happened recently in 
the case of Bob Woodruff and others, the story becomes their injuries and their 
prognosis and not that of the American selVicemen who may have died in selVice 
to his or her nation while providing them protection . That aspect of the mili tary-
media relationship and the related reporting has not been ignored by the American 
people. 
What marked the initial success ofthe embedding process, in my view, was the 
fact that the additional experience and training provided these reporters enabled 
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them to turn the situation into an educational opportunity for their audience. 
Through their understanding of the events in the context of the operational re-
quirements of the conflict, they were less likely to resort to quick criticism, "got-
cha" reporting and wildly negative predictions. As Navy Commander Brendon 
McClane has suggested in an excellent recent article in Parameters magazine, the 
next step should be to bring trusted reporters into the operations center to gain a 
needed context for their stories. I I While this would have to be carefully tailored de-
pending on the conflict and the sensitivity of the information, one can reasonably 
conclude that reporters like Rick Atkinson, Major Garrett and Ted Koppel, with a 
long history of trust by commanders, would be likely first candidates. 
Access to the operations center would also give access to an understanding of 
the rules of engagement approved for and employed by the force involved. Rules of 
engagement, although highly classified, nevertheless provide the legal and opera-
tional roadmap for our military's response to attack, both geographically and with 
regard to weapons systems and procedures. The understanding of these approved 
operational procedures, which are trained to by our fo rces, would preclude un-
founded claims of violations, because these rules are drafted after careful review of 
the legal restrictions applicable and after a careful review of the combatant status of 
individuals engaged. When a civilian woman or child is acting as a combatant, the 
fact that the individual no longer enjoys civilian protections should be understood 
by every journalist reporting the story, even if that fact is personally distasteful. 
When a civilian family is harboring a terrorist in their house who is firing on US 
troops serving in Iraq and representing the interests of the democratically elected 
government, as is alleged to have happened at Haditha, the reporters need to know 
that the home is no longer a protected place but has become a safe haven for the en-
emy. These are the basics, but they often seem not to be within the lexicon used by 
the fourth estate. 
When we have reporters who understand the law, have good judgment and have 
integrity, their reporting tends to be clear, more accurate and in context. When 
they do not exhibit these traits, their reporting can be misleading and worse, it 
tends to frustrate the military and, as we witnessed after Vietnam, preclude an ef-
fective dialogue in future military engagements. 
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